Cia vault 7 archives download

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Contact us to discuss how to proceed. Code-named Vault 7 by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency. The first full part of the series, Year Zero , comprises 8, documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA 's Center for Cyber Intelligence in Langley, Virgina.

It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA espionage orders for the French presidential election. Year Zero and the tools themselves are discussed more in-depth on the Vault 7 page. Vault 7 is a series of WikiLeaks releases on the CIA and the methods and means they use to hack, monitor, control and even disable systems ranging from smartphones, to TVs, to even dental implants.

The Vault7 leaks themselves can be found on WikiLeaks. So far the first release in the Vault 7 series has been titled "Year Zero" and includes a number of branches of the CIA 's Center for Cyber Intelligence and their projects. This page and its related pages are meant to comprehensively break down the enormous material of Vault 7 into something more meaningful to readers less familiar with this technical material.

Due to the size of this publication and redactions required, we are still in the process of identifying targets of CIA hacking with a community research challenge. The following are the relevant branches and departments of CCI also highlighted in the org chart. This is a list of the malware, CIA hacking projects, and other vulnerabilities documented in Vault 7.

Many have their own pages with additional details. This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U. Since the CIA has gained political and budgetary preeminence over the U. The CIA found itself building not just its now infamous drone fleet, but a very different type of covert, globe-spanning force — its own substantial fleet of hackers.

This historical release includes: the Central Intelligence Bulletin reports from 2 January June pages. Aerial intelligence collection platforms have played a critical role in US national security from the earliest beginnings of aviation. Despite their success, however, use of these platforms carried significant risks and repercussions, including detection and even pilot loss, such as the downing of the U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers in Ever-evolving research by the CIA led to the development concept of unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs as collection platforms.

An innovative Agency program in the s codenamed Aquiline was the very first to test this concept. Based initially on the study of flight characteristics of birds, Aquiline was envisioned as a long-range vehicle that could safely and stealthily provide a window into denied areas such as the Soviet Union through photography and other capabilities, and would even support in-place agent operations.

The core components of the OTS system are based on products from Cross Match , a US company specializing in biometric software for law enforcement and the Intelligence Community. The company hit the headlines in when it was reported that the US military used a Cross Match product to identify Osama bin Laden during the assassination operation in Pakistan. It provides the ability to collect either the stream as a video file AVI or capture still images JPG of frames from the stream that are of significant change from a previously captured frame.

It utilizes ffmpeg for video and image encoding and decoding as well as RTSP connectivity. Dumbo is a capability to suspend processes utilizing webcams and corrupt any video recordings that could compromise a PAG deployment. Dumbo can identify, control and manipulate monitoring and detection systems on a target computer running the Microsoft Windows operating sytem.

It identifies installed devices like webcams and microphones, either locally or connected by wireless Bluetooth, WiFi or wired networks. By deleting or manipulating recordings the operator is aided in creating fake or destroying actual evidence of the intrusion operation. Dumbo is run by the field agent directly from an USB stick; it requires administrator privileges to perform its task.

Achilles is a capability that provides an operator the ability to trojan an OS X disk image. It is compatible with the NOD Cryptographic Specification and provides structured command and control that is similar to that used by several Windows implants.

It runs on Mac OSX The documents were submitted to the CIA between November 21 st , just two weeks after Raytheon acquired Blackbird Technologies to build a Cyber Powerhouse and September 11 th , They mostly contain Proof-of-Concept ideas and assessments for malware attack vectors - partly based on public documents from security researchers and private enterprises in the computer security field.

Raytheon Blackbird Technologies acted as a kind of "technology scout" for the Remote Development Branch RDB of the CIA by analysing malware attacks in the wild and giving recommendations to the CIA development teams for further investigation and PoC development for their own malware projects. HighRise is an Android application designed for mobile devices running Android 4. It provides a redirector function for SMS messaging that could be used by a number of IOC tools that use SMS messages for communication between implants and listening posts.

The implants described in both projects are designed to intercept and exfiltrate SSH credentials but work on different operating systems with different attack vectors. These credentials are either username and password in case of password-authenticated SSH sessions or username, filename of private SSH key and key password if public key authentication is used.

BothanSpy can exfiltrate the stolen credentials to a CIA-controlled server so the implant never touches the disk on the target system or save it in an enrypted file for later exfiltration by other means. BothanSpy is installed as a Shellterm 3. Gyrfalcon is an implant that targets the OpenSSH client on Linux platforms centos,debian,rhel,suse,ubuntu. The implant can not only steal user credentials of active SSH sessions, but is also capable of collecting full or partial OpenSSH session traffic.

All collected information is stored in an encrypted file for later exfiltration. OutlawCountry allows for the redirection of all outbound network traffic on the target computer to CIA controlled machines for ex- and infiltration purposes. The installation and persistence method of the malware is not described in detail in the document; an operator will have to rely on the available CIA exploits and backdoors to inject the kernel module into a target operating system.

OutlawCountry v1. Also, OutlawCountry v1. Once persistently installed on a target machine using separate CIA exploits, the malware scans visible WiFi access points and records the ESS identifier, MAC address and signal strength at regular intervals. To perform the data collection the target machine does not have to be online or connected to an access point; it only needs to be running with an enabled WiFi device.

If it is connected to the internet, the malware automatically tries to use public geo-location databases from Google or Microsoft to resolve the position of the device and stores the longitude and latitude data along with the timestamp. The malware itself does not beacon this data to a CIA back-end; instead the operator must actively retrieve the log file from the device - again using separate CIA exploits and backdoors.

Additional back-end software again using public geo-location databases from Google and Microsoft converts unprocessed access point information from exfiltrated logfiles to geo-location data to create a tracking profile of the target device. Brutal Kangaroo is a tool suite for Microsoft Windows that targets closed networks by air gap jumping using thumbdrives. Brutal Kangaroo components create a custom covert network within the target closed network and providing functionality for executing surveys, directory listings, and arbitrary executables.

The documents describe how a CIA operation can infiltrate a closed network or a single air-gapped computer within an organization or enterprise without direct access. It first infects a Internet-connected computer within the organization referred to as "primary host" and installs the BrutalKangeroo malware on it.

When a user is using the primary host and inserts a USB stick into it, the thumbdrive itself is infected with a separate malware. If multiple computers on the closed network are under CIA control, they form a covert network to coordinate tasks and data exchange.

Although not explicitly stated in the documents, this method of compromising closed networks is very similar to how Stuxnet worked. The Brutal Kangaroo project consists of the following components: Drifting Deadline is the thumbdrive infection tool, Shattered Assurance is a server tool that handles automated infection of thumbdrives as the primary mode of propagation for the Brutal Kangaroo suite , Broken Promise is the Brutal Kangaroo postprocessor to evaluate collected information and Shadow is the primary persistence mechanism a stage 2 tool that is distributed across a closed network and acts as a covert command-and-control network; once multiple Shadow instances are installed and share drives, tasking and payloads can be sent back-and-forth.

The primary execution vector used by infected thumbdrives is a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system that can be exploited by hand-crafted link files that load and execute programs DLLs without user interaction. CherryBlossom provides a means of monitoring the Internet activity of and performing software exploits on Targets of interest.

In particular, CherryBlossom is focused on compromising wireless networking devices, such as wireless routers and access points APs , to achieve these goals. Such Wi-Fi devices are commonly used as part of the Internet infrastructure in private homes, public spaces bars, hotels or airports , small and medium sized companies as well as enterprise offices.

Therefore these devices are the ideal spot for "Man-In-The-Middle" attacks, as they can easily monitor, control and manipulate the Internet traffic of connected users. By altering the data stream between the user and Internet services, the infected device can inject malicious content into the stream to exploit vulnerabilities in applications or the operating system on the computer of the targeted user.

The wireless device itself is compromized by implanting a customized CherryBlossom firmware on it; some devices allow upgrading their firmware over a wireless link, so no physical access to the device is necessary for a successful infection. Once the new firmware on the device is flashed, the router or access point will become a so-called FlyTrap.

The beaconed information contains device status and security information that the CherryTree logs to a database. In response to this information, the CherryTree sends a Mission with operator-defined tasking. An operator can use CherryWeb , a browser-based user interface to view Flytrap status and security info, plan Mission tasking, view Mission -related data, and perform system administration tasks. The CherryTree logs Alerts to a database, and, potentially distributes Alert information to interested parties via Catapult.

Today, June 1st , WikiLeaks publishes documents from the "Pandemic" project of the CIA, a persistent implant for Microsoft Windows machines that share files programs with remote users in a local network. The implant allows the replacement of up to 20 programs with a maximum size of MB for a selected list of remote users targets. As the name suggests, a single computer on a local network with shared drives that is infected with the "Pandemic" implant will act like a "Patient Zero" in the spread of a disease.

It will infect remote computers if the user executes programs stored on the pandemic file server. Although not explicitly stated in the documents, it seems technically feasible that remote computers that provide file shares themselves become new pandemic file servers on the local network to reach new targets.

It allows the operator to configure settings during runtime while the implant is on target to customize it to an operation. On their website, Siege Technologies states that the company " In an email from HackingTeam published by WikiLeaks here , Jason Syversen, founder of Siege Technologies with a background in cryptography and hacking, "